Risk-Taking Incentives, Governance, and Losses in theFinancial Crisis

This paper studies the extent to which risk-taking incentives of CEOs and other governancefeatures in a range of years prior to the recent financial crisis were related to the write-downsof U.S. financial institutions during the crisis. We document that institutions whose CEOs hadparticularly strong risk-taking incentives, weak ownership incentives and independent boardshad the highest write-downs, both in absolute terms and relative to total assets.[...]

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2010-07-01
Authors:	Chesney, Marc ; Stromberg, Jacob ; Wagner, Alexander F.
Institutions:	Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research North South <Bern>
Subject:	Management \| Unternehmensgröße \| Anreiz \| Risikoverteilung \| Kompensation \| compensation

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	352256 bytes 45 p. application/pdf
Series:	FINRISK Working Paper Series Working Paper ; No. 607
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	G01 - Financial Crises ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; Management and business planning ; Strategic management ; Employment of capital, capital investment planning and estimate of investment profitability ; Management of financial services: stock exchange and bank management science (including saving banks) ; Management of insurance ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009305115