Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets : theories of harm for abuse cases
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Motta, Massimo |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 90.2023, Art.-No. 102974, p. 1-20
|
Subject: | Abuse of dominance | Digital platforms | Exclusionary practices | Monopolization | Self-preferencing | Two-sided markets | Vertical foreclosure | Marktmacht | Market power | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Netzwerkökonomik | Network economics | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Digitale Plattform | Digital platform | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Monopol | Monopoly | Online-Marketing | Internet marketing | Theorie | Theory |
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Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets : theories of harm for abuse cases
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Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets : theories of harm for abuse cases
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Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets : theories of harm for abuse cases
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