Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement when there are criminal teams
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Feess, Eberhard ; Walzl, Markus |
Published in: |
Economica. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0013-0427, ZDB-ID 1800-4. - Vol. 71.2004, p. 333-348
|
Subject: | Kriminalitätsökonomik | Economics of crime | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement |
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