Stable and Sustainable Global Tax Coordination with Leviathan Governments

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.’s model.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Eichner, Thomas ; Pethig, Rüdiger
Institutions:	CESifo
Subject:	global tax coordination \| repeated game \| sustainability \| stability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 4909
Classification:	H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877774