Stealth compensation: Do CEOs increase their pay by influencing dividend policy?
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Minnick, Kristina ; Rosenthal, Leonard |
Published in: |
Journal of Corporate Finance. - Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199. - Vol. 25.2014, C, p. 435-454
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Executive compensation | Payout policy | Firm performance | Corporate governance |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Classification: | M41 - Accounting ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods |
Source: |
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