Strategy-proof social choice correspondences
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Barberà, Salvador ; Dutta, Bhaskar ; Sen, Arunava |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 101.2001, 2, p. 374-394
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Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Erwartungsnutzen | Expected utility | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Diktatur | Dictatorship | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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