Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Year of publication: |
September 2012
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Authors: | Reffgen, Alexander ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 7.2012, 3, p. 663-688
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Subject: | Multiple public goods | strategy-proofness | voting under constraints | additive preferences | separable preferences | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE909 [DOI] hdl:10419/150182 [Handle] |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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