Structural remedies as a signalling device

We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus ; Wey, Christian
Publisher:	Düsseldorf : Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Subject:	Remedies \| Divestiture \| Merger Control \| Signalling

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Series:	DICE Discussion Paper ; 209
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	978-3-86304-208-0
Other identifiers:	846114119 [GVK] hdl:10419/125930 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:dicedp:209 [RePEc]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; K21 - Antitrust Law
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414174