Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information : Dispensing with public randomization
Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be “decorrelated” to produce a payoff‐equivalent SPE of the original game. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun (2020) on existence of SPE without public randomization, which in turn yields equilibrium existence for stochastic games with weakly continuous state transitions.
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Barelli, Paulo ; Duggan, John |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - The Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 16.2021, 4, p. 1221-1248
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Publisher: |
The Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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