Targeting in-kind transfers through market design : a revealed preference analysis of public housing allocation
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Waldinger, Daniel |
Published in: |
American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1944-7981, ZDB-ID 2009979-4. - Vol. 111.2021, 8, p. 2660-2696
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Subject: | Soziale Wohnungspolitik | Social housing | Auswahl | Selection | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Umverteilung | Redistribution | Rationierung | Rationing | Wartezeit | Waiting time | Sachtransfer | In-kind transfer | Offenbarte Präferenzen | Revealed preferences | USA | United States | 2010-2014 |
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