The banks set and the uncovered set in budget allocation problems
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Dutta, Bhaskar ; Jackson, Matthew O. ; Le Breton, Michel |
Published in: |
Social choice and strategic decisions : essays in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks ; with 17 tables. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-540-22053-4. - 2005, p. 163-199
|
Subject: | Öffentliche Ausgaben | Public expenditure | Allokation | Allocation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Theorie | Theory |
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