The Effect of State Antitakeover Laws on Corporate Tax Avoidance

We examine the implications of enhanced managerial control afforded by state anti-takeover laws for tax avoidance and find the strength of anti-takeover statutes in a state is negatively related to tax avoidance of firms incorporated in that state. In testing underlying mechanisms, we find that the empirical results support the price discount concern hypothesis (i.e., managers refrain from tax avoidance activities to prevent potential stock price discounts induced by heightened investor perception of tax-related rent extraction in firms with severe agency problems). By contrast, the results are inconsistent with the quiet life hypothesis (i.e., managers entrenched by state anti-takeover protection enjoy the quiet life by under-investing in tax planning opportunities). Our findings are generally consistent with the takeover market phenomenon that one of managers' concerns lies in their inability to re-contract away the adverse consequences of perceived agency problems arising from state anti-takeover protection