The (ir)resistible rise of agency rents
Year of publication: |
2013-05
|
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Authors: | Biais, Bruno ; Landier, Augustin |
Institutions: | Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) |
Subject: | Agency rents | moral hazard | nance sector | dynamic contracts | opacity |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series IDEI Working Paper Number 788 |
Classification: | D3 - Distribution ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; G2 - Financial Institutions and Services |
Source: |
-
The (ir)resistible rise of agency rents
Biais, Bruno, (2013)
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Endogenous agency problems and the dynamics of rents
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Pooling promises with moral hazard
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