The Moral Trial : Economists and the Socratic Problem

Following a stream of experimental results (e.g. Marwell and Ames 1981, Carter and Irons 1991, Frank et al. 1993, Yezer et al. 1996, Selten and Ockenfelds 1998, Frank and Schulze 2000, Frey and Meier 2002, Rubinstein 2006), it has become common to believe that economists are more selfish than non-economists. This literature resembles a 'moral trial' against the profession. The nature of the trial and its assessment, however, remain unclear under several respects. In this paper I review and clarify the charges and the evidence; and I argue that both are insufficient to make any judgement final. Further elaboration is in order to draw meaningful implications from the current charge (i.e. economists are more selfish than non-economists); further investigation into the causes of this phenomenon (i.e. whether it is due to 'self-selection' or 'training') is required to make the charge a source of blame and to eventually establish a need for correction; and further evidence is needed to sustain the charges. In order to make a compelling case against economists or economics, several alternative explanations (beyond self-selection and training) ought to be considered. Should the additional explanations prove sound, they might lead to different charges and different implications