The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard
This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a fairly general model, and identifies six types of market failure. Each of the subsequent sections focusses on a particular market failure.
Year of publication: |
1986
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Authors: | Arnott, Richard ; Stiglitz, Joseph |
Institutions: | Economics Department, Queen's University |
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