Time series variation in the efficacy of executive risk-taking incentives : the role of market-wide uncertainty
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Cadman, Brian D. ; Campbell, John L. ; Johnson, Ryan G. |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 99.2024, 2, p. 113-141
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Subject: | executive compensation | market uncertainty | corporate governance | risk-taking incentives | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Risiko | Risk | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Aktienoption | Stock option |
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