Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility : ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Castro, Luciano I. de ; Yannelis, Nicholas C. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 177.2018, p. 678-707
|
Subject: | Ambiguity aversion | Asymmetric information | First-best | Incentive compatibility | Mechanism design | Second-best | Asymmetrische Information | Anreiz | Incentives | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Risiko | Risk |
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