Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis.If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants.We nd that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	van Ours, Jan ; Albrecht, J.W.
Institutions:	Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Subject:	education \| labour demand

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 2001-49
Classification:	I20 - Education. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092692