Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Amorós, Pablo |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 190.2020, p. 1-3
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Subject: | Mechanism design | Social choice aggregation of experts’ judgments | Sub-majoritarian choice rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Experten | Experts |
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