Veto players, market discipline, and structural fiscal consolidations
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Leibrecht, Markus ; Scharler, Johann |
Published in: |
Public choice. - New York, NY : Springer Science+Business Media LLC, ISSN 1573-7101, ZDB-ID 1475723-0. - Vol. 188.2021, 3/4, p. 361-384
|
Subject: | Fiscal consolidation | Veto player | Market discipline hypothesis | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Veto | OECD-Staaten | OECD countries | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Theorie | Theory | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt |
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