When trust fades...: Can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Major, Iván |
Institutions: | International Telecommunications Society (ITS) |
Subject: | mechanism design | incentive theory | adverse selection | moral hazard | Bayesian games |
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When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
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When trust fades...: Can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
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