We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two … dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is veri?able (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2 … quality 1 increases or decreases the provider's marginal disutility and the patients' marginal benefit from quality 2 (i …

We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i …. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer budgets … increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost …

We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i …. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer budgets … increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost …

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public … the open-loop solution (providers choose the optimal quality investment plan based on demand at the initial period) and … the feedback closed-loop solution (providers observe demand in each period and choose quality in response to current …

We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering both the effect … structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received …

We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i …. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer budgets … increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost …

We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i …. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer budgets … increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost …

We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effoort when their budgets are soft … state. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer … budgets increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost …

We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering both the effect … structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received …