Private monitoring and communication in cartels : explaining recent collusive practices

Joseph E. Harrington; Andrzej Skrzypacz

Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Harrington, Joseph Emmett ; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
Publisher:	Baltimore, Md. : Johns Hopkins Univ., Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Kartell \| Cartel \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Industrieökonomik \| Industrial organization

Extent:	Online-Ressource, (39, [1] S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Working papers / Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University. - Baltimore, Md. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2189307-X. - Vol. 555
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/49871 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003868652