A ormative argument towards the independence of public debt management

Panagiotis Tsintzos, Tilemahos Efthimiadis, Stephanos Papadamou, Eleftherios Spyromitros

We explore the links between credit expansion, inflation, and inflation expectations, and show that active public debt management can trigger a non-interest rate channel of credit expansion. This creates incentives for the government to use debt management for promoting non-debt management goals, thus, choosing debt maturity structure that differs from its optimal. Through a theoretical monetary policy game, we show that it is welfare improving to delegate public debt management to an independent office separate from the fiscal authority.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Tsintzos, Panagiotis ; Efthimiadis, Tilemahos ; Papadamou, Stephanos ; Spyromitros, Eleftherios
Published in:	Review of Economic Analysis : REA. - Rimini : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1973-3909, ZDB-ID 2535745-1. - Vol. 15.2023, 2, p. 127-137
Subject:	Macroprudential policy \| Fiscal policy \| Central banks \| Public debt \| Öffentliche Schulden \| Schuldenmanagement \| Debt management \| Finanzpolitik \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy \| Finanzmarktaufsicht \| Financial supervision \| Zentralbank \| Central bank \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wirkungsanalyse \| Impact assessment

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.15353/rea.v15i2.4928 [DOI] hdl:10419/328148 [Handle]
Classification:	E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; E60 - Macroeconomic Policy Formation, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook. General ; H63 - Debt; Debt Management
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014310311