A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Karmokar, Madhuparna ; Roy, Souvik ; Storcken, Ton |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 183.2019, p. 1-4
|
Subject: | Dictatorship | Group strategy-proofness | Inseparable top-pair | Pareto optimality | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Diktatur | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Kollektives Handeln | Collective action | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making |
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