A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision
Year of publication: |
2009-10-13
|
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Authors: | Bonanno, Giacomo |
Institutions: | Economics Department, University of California-Davis |
Subject: | Choice function | AGM belief revision | extensive-form game | sequential equilibrium | iterated belief revision | backward induction |
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