A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals

For an odd number of individuals Campbell and Kelly [2] show that over the set of profiles that admit a strong Condorcet winner, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice function. This paper shows that the situation is quite different in the case of an even number of individuals, and provides a characterization of strategy-proof social choice rules in this case.

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Year of publication:	2007-10-03
Authors:	Merrill, Lauren N.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, College of William & Mary
Subject:	majority rule \| Condorcet domain \| dicatorial rule \| stratefy-proof

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 60 13 pages
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247919