A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Year of publication:	2002-10-09
Authors:	Winter, Eyal ; Volij, Oscar ; Dagan, Nir
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 4, p. 811-823
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 6 September 2001
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752873