A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires

In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of a neo-parliamentary or mixed semi-presidential government form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial.

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Year of publication:	2004-10
Authors:	Vannucci, Stefano
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, Facoltà di Economia "Richard M. Goodwin"

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department of Economics University of Siena.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	O25 - Industrial Policy ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704522