A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

This paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270. - Vol. 49.2020, 4, p. 1129-1142
Publisher:	Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer
Subject:	Finitely repeated games \| Pure strategy \| Observable mixed strategies \| Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium \| Limit perfect folk theorem

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1007/s00182-020-00735-z [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014503380