A computationally efficient characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large entry games

This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from entry games with multiple equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Cohen, Andrew
Institutions:	Federal Reserve Board (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
Subject:	Game theory \| Econometric models \| Equilibrium (Economics)

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Extent:	text/html application/pdf
Series:	Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2005-37
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005721019