A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities
Pierre Cartigny; Luc Champarnaud
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Cartigny, Pierre ; Champarnaud, Luc |
| Published in: |
Research in economics : an international review of economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1090-9443, ZDB-ID 1379004-3. - Vol. 67.2013, 4, p. 328-335
|
| Subject: | Dynamic game | Bureaucracy | Administrative design | Fiscal federalism | Dynamic non-local externality | Finanzbeziehungen | Fiscal relations | Dynamisches Spiel | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Finanzausgleich | Intergovernmental transfers | Bürokratie | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010258496