A dynamic model of censorship

Yiman Sun

We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase in tenure. When bad news is conclusive, censorship hurts the evaluator, the good agent, and possibly the bad agent. However, when bad news is inconclusive, censorship may benefit all those players. This is because the good agent censors bad news more aggressively than the bad agent, which improves the quality of information.

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Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	Sun, Yiman
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 19.2024, 1, p. 29-60
Subject:	Censorship \| dynamic games \| information manipulation \| learning \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Manipulation \| Meinungsfreiheit \| Freedom of expression \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie \| Economic dynamics \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE4639 [DOI] hdl:10419/296453 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468060