A dynamic reinterpretation of nash bargaining with endogenous threats
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David G. |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 83.2015, 4, p. 1641-1655
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Subject: | Nash bargaining | endogenous threats | repeated games | stochastic games | equilibrium selection | contracts | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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