A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Laclau, Marie |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 76.2012, 2, p. 711-737
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Repeated games | Imperfect monitoring | Networks | Folk theorem | Communication protocols |
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