A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aiba, Katsuhiko |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 86.2014, p. 58-66
|
Subject: | Stochastic games | Private monitoring | Folk theorem | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Folk-Theorem | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal |
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