A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness

This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benevolents.

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Year of publication:	2007-02-23
Authors:	Canegrati, Emanuele

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Canegrati, Emanuele (2007): A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness.
Classification:	D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H31 - Household ; H27 - Other Sources of Revenue ; H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015219261