A Game-Theoretic Rendering of Promises and Threats

The paper formalizes several of the ideas about commitment set out by Thomas Schelling in 'The Strategy of Conflict'. Using a game-theoretic framework we formalize and interpret 'promise' and 'threat' as different species of commitment. We also distinguish the 'pure promise', the 'pure threat', and the 'hybrid'. Using examples we discuss the friendliness of promises and the unfriendliness of threats

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Klein, Daniel B. ; O'Flaherty, Brendan
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, pp. 295-314, Vol. 21, 1993
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073929