A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Hou, Dongshuang ; Han, Weibin ; Xu, Genjiu ; Feng, Yifan |
Published in: |
4OR : quarterly journal of the Belgian, French and Italian Operations Research Societies. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1614-2411, ZDB-ID 2106212-2. - Vol. 22.2024, 1, p. 17-30
|
Subject: | Axiomatization | Cooperative cost game | Generalized CIS value | Optimization | Selfishness level | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | GUS-Staaten | CIS countries | Shapley-Wert | Shapley value | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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