A Generic Game With no Self-Enforcing Equilibrium.

Under not-too-stringent assumptions this study shows that there exists a generic extensive-form game having no "strategically stable" equilibrium. In addition, it is suggested that careless invocation of "common belief assumption" may be a potential source of inconsistent beliefs for players.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Arana, A.Q.
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

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Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	21 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572142