A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements: Note

In a 2007 paper, “A global game with strategic substitutes and complements”, by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155-175, an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement and presents an alternative proof for a finite player version of their model.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015-03
Authors:	Hoffmann, Eric ; Sabarwal, Tarun
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Kansas
Subject:	Global games \| strategic complements \| strategic substitutes \| monotone games \| equilibrium selection

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 201409 4 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011198718