A Law and Economics Analysis of Lobbying Regulation - Towards an Optimal Structure Through the Cost Indicator Index

The dynamic regulation of lobbying worldwide requires fast comparative learning, while pressures for the reduction of public debts require responsible and efficient policymaking. The main intention of this research was to improve both comparative assessment and practical policymaking by offering a new tool for the assessment of lobbying regulations, both structurally and comparatively. This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation research arena. It introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure the direct compliance costs of lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index (CII) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and quantitative assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the comparative and the sui generis dimension. The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the last decade, but it is the only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying regulations. Beside the qualitative contribution, the research introduces an additional theoretical framework for complementary qualitative analysis of the lobbying laws. The Ninefold theory allows a more structured assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and costs. Lastly, this research introduces the Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These labels might improve an ex-antelobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, primarily in the sui generis perspective.In its final part, the research focuses on four South East European countries (Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), and for the first time brings them into the discussion and calculates their CPI and CII scores. The special focus of the application was on Serbia, whose proposal on the Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms, taking into consideration specific political and economic circumstances of the country.Although the obtained results are of an indicative nature, the CII will probably find its place within the academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of lobbying regulations worldwide