A Learning Approach to Auctions

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.

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Year of publication:	1996-10-06
Authors:	Hon-Snir, Shlomit ; Monderer, Dov ; Sela, Aner
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Auctions Learning

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on Unix; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 28 28 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062361