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A Learning Approach to Auctions

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bid are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.
Year of publication:
1996-10
Authors: Monderer, Dov ; Hon-Snir, Shlomit ; Sela, Aner
Institutions: University of Bonn, Germany
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Series:
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Classification: C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D44 - Auctions
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