"A little is better than zero" or "pay enough or don’t pay at all"? : evidence on the size of pay-for-performance across the sectors
Year of publication: |
June 2018
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Authors: | Chen, Chung-An |
Published in: |
Public personnel management. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, ISSN 0091-0260, ZDB-ID 191388-8. - Vol. 47.2018, 2, p. 119-143
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Subject: | performance pay | pay size | self-determination theory | public-private comparison | motivation crowding | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Betriebsgröße | Firm size | Vergleich | Comparison | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Lohn | Wages | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Vergütungssystem im öffentlichen Dienst | Public sector pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Lohnstruktur | Wage structure |
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