A Marginalistic Value for Monotonic Set Games

In this paper we characterize a value, called a marginalistic value, for monotonic set games, which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games. For this characterization we use a modification of the strong monotonicity axiom of Young, but the proof is rather different from his.

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Year of publication:	1998-05-19
Authors:	Funaki, Yukihiko ; Hoede, Kees ; Aarts, Harry
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 26.1997, 1, p. 97-111
Publisher:	Springer

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Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received November 1993
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598526