A method for identifying parameterizations of the Compensation election and Quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Vragov, Roumen ; Smith, Vernon L. |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 122.2023, p. 7-16
|
Subject: | Bayes-Nash equilibria | Voting systems | Direct democracy | Quadratic voting | Compensation election | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Wahlsystem | Electoral system | Wahl | Election | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Abstimmung | Voting |
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