A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections

Game-theoretic model of election to a corporate board of directors is proposed. It is shown that the equilibrium distribution of seats is unique. The uniqueness guarantees nonmanipulability of elections. The distribution is obtained by the d’Hondt method of seats distribution in proportional representation problem. The model is tested on real data from a Russian company.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Karpov, A.
Published in:	Journal of the New Economic Association. - New Economic Association - NEA. - 2011, 12, p. 10-23
Publisher:	New Economic Association - NEA
Subject:	Elections \| board of directors \| equilibrium seats distribution \| d'Hondt method

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	Russian
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; G39 - Corporate Finance and Governance. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422044