A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games

We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Tsomocos, Dimitrios P. ; Voliotis, Dimitris
Institutions:	Finance Research Centre, Oxford University

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	OFRC Working Papers Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005509824