A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES

We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	TSOMOCOS, DIMITRIOS P. ; VOLIOTIS, DIMITRIS
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 11.2009, 04, p. 479-489
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Market games \| bounded rationality \| rational learning

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475658